Rinaa Elina Kullaa

"Neutralism and CSCE: The Finnish and the Yugoslav Models
for Neutralism — the Birth and the Development of CSCE"

This paper discusses the conceptualization of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe by neutral European states using Finland and Yugoslavia as comparative examples. The Finnish and the Yugoslav efforts and interests for the hosting of the CSCE conferences initially in Helsinki in 1975 and later in Belgrade in 1977 are outlined. The paper discusses how the idea for the CSCE developed as a strategy for the maintenance of neutralism policies in Finland and in Yugoslavia. These states chose neutralism initially as a solution to military security dilemmas created by the extension of the Soviet border and Soviet presence in Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The goal of both the Finnish neutralism and the Yugoslav Non-Alignment in the 1950s was to avoid war with the Soviet Union by guaranteeing the integrity of the long Soviet border. Bilateral relations with the Soviet Union were established in the 1950s while Finland and Yugoslavia remained outside of defensive international alignments. Integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions was limited to the realm of economics. The context of the Second World War dominated the drafting of the Finnish and the Yugoslav neutralisms in the 1950s. In the early 1970s the CSCE movement served to find a second rationale for preserving neutralism in these states which continued to lie in close proximity to the Soviet border in Europe. The CSCE process highlights the hallmarks of the Finnish and the Yugoslav neutralisms already outlined in the 1950s: Soviet geopolitical influence over the Warsaw Pact countries and therefore its extended de-facto border with Europe was not challenged as the post-war borders were ratified; simultaneously economic and cultural integration with Western Europe was furthered. In this paper the strategic motivation by the neutralist states to maintaining their integrity in close proximity to the Soviet-European border during the Cold War is juxtaposed broadly against the broad achievements in economic and cultural integration of Eastern and Western Europe .
This paper briefly introduces the comparative conceptualization of the Finnish and the Yugoslav neutralism strategies after the Second World War. The paper discusses how the Finnish and the Yugoslav neutralisms influenced each other between 1948 and the early 1970s and created a bilateral dialogue. This introduction is followed by an analysis of the Finnish strategy and steps towards the CSCE conference in 1975. The paper argues that the Finnish decision-making was largely based upon strategic thinking in defecting pressure from both the Soviet Union and the Euro-Atlantic coalition in the wake of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the 1973 oil crisis. The Finnish leadership was in fact not convinced of the forthcoming success of the CSCE conference in Helsinki in 1975 and was even surprised by its extensive results especially with regard to engaging the Soviet Union. The paper therefore focuses on the developments and dilemmas facing the CSCE movement between the Helsinki Conference and the Belgrade conference as the results of the Helsinki conference unfolded during this period. This paper argues that the key motivation behind the movement in Finland and in Yugoslavia was geopolitical strategy. Moreover, in both countries the CSCE conferences and the Helsinki-movement elevated the international profile of the long-standing presidents Urho Kekkonen and Josip Broz ‘Tito’. The conferences served to create domestic legitimacy for their long-term foreign policy strategies of neutralism in the last decades of the Cold War.  For Yugoslavia the CSCE served even further as an elevator of the Yugoslav role within the Non-Aligned movement against the challenges for leadership by other Non-Aligned states such as Cuba. This strategic motivation behind the organization of the CSCE conferences is lastly contrasted with the broad results of the Helsinki-Movement. The paper takes a specific look at the economic cooperation and integration of Finland with Western European economy as a case study of clear success of one of the stated goals of the CSCE Helsinki conference.
The sources for the paper include primary sources from the Finnish Foreign Ministry Archive, the Urho Kekkonen Presidential Archive, The Marshall Tito Presidential Archive and the Archive of Serbia and Montenegro. The sources were collected within between 2005 and 2007 and this paper has not been presented or published previously elsewhere.