Oliver Bange

"The FRG and the GDR and the Belgrade CSCE Conference"

Rather than adding to the already existing literature on inner-German relations the paper would aim to put, analyse and interpret German-German relations in the Schmidt-Honecker era within a wider international framework. This includes the changes in the grand strategies of the two super-powers (Carter's human rights rhetoric and Brezhnev's attempts to construct a status quo in Europe), which so fundamentally altered the environment within which German relations had to be conducted. It also refers to the FRG's enhanced position within Western organisations (NATO, WEU, EEC etc.), something which caused major concern to Helmut Schmidt (as witnessed by his "Marbella-paper") who suspected that the image of a powerful FRG would be counterproductive to West German economic, Eastern, EC and alliance policies. Instead, Schmidt attempted to continue the pursuit of the transformation goals embedded in Ostpolitik through a combination of economic East-West contacts and less high-profile events. Like Brandt and Bahr before, Schmidt thereby aimed at increasing East-West interdependence. Once achieved this network of mutual benefits might then serve as a safety-net in times of aggrevated conflict. Though the human rights issues codified in basket III of the Helsinki Final Act were at the heart of West German Ostpolitik (both as a means to improve living conditions of fellow-Germans under communist rule and as an instrument to further change throughout the Warsaw Pact), a heated confrontation over the topic with the representatives of the Warsaw Pact at Belgrade could endanger – in Bonn's view - the entire process. This prospective clash of interests (or merely strategies) within the West was clearly perceived in East-Berlin and Moscow. Honecker sought and received permission for a special role towards the FRG. Officially, his so-called "peace-policy" of co-operative offers and appeals to the West Germans should further the division in the Western alliance and thus help to avoid an extensive human rights discussion at Belgrade, something which both the East German and the Soviet regimes were afraid of (and, incidentally, the fear of which contributed to the relative soft-pedalling strategies against domestic dissidents). Beyond this wider goal, it seems that Honecker hoped to maintain and improve German-German relations through a special personal relationship with Schmidt. This course held obvious economic advantages as well as an enhanced domestic and international position for Honecker personally on the basis of his mediatory role between East and West. However, Honecker's intensifying contacts with Schmidt also led to suspicions both within his own politburo and in Moscow over his reliability for the Eastern course.
For this variety of reasons, both Germanies were extremely active within their respective blocs, across the blocs and particularly in communications with the Yugoslav organisers in order to prepare and – if possible - steer the Belgrade conference according to their respective strategical goals.
In as much the paper understands the Belgrade CSCE-Conference as a formative phase for both Schmidt's Ostpolitik and Honecker's Westpolitik – and a decisive moment in the multilateral anchoring of détente in Europe.
The analysis is based on official and private papers from both West and East German archives (among them the private papers of Brandt, Bahr, Schmidt – with a special allowance to consult his documents until the end of his chancellorship -, the diplomatic archives of both sides, extensive research in the Stasi-files, GDR government and SED party papers, the Kanzleramt-documents, some military files etc.), British, American, French, some Soviet papers, documentary sources from various Eastern European archives from the document-pool of the CSCE-project in Mannheim.