Angela Romano

"The EC and the Belgrade CSCE"

Since the preparation for the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Western European governments tried to promote their own idea of détente, which was meant at promoting a gradual loosening of the bipolar restraints, by enhancing economic interdependence in the Continent as a means for achieving both stability and security. In their analysis, the stronger the economic ties and dependencies between East and West, the less likely a repetition of Cold War-style confrontations would become. In addition, the multiplication of contacts would not only make East-West coexistence easier and safer, but would – in due course – put critical questions in the Eastern regimes and thus help to transform communist societies from within. In order to deal with the subject, the EC member states devoted their brand new European Political Cooperation – launched in December 1969 at The Hague summit – to the CSCE. Imbued with the idea of promoting the European identity and playing a visible and constructive role in the international arena, the Nine set up proper mechanisms and realised an effective, on time, and extremely precise coordination. The Nine were able to speak with one voice throughout the whole Conference and were fundamental contributors to the Final Act, which it’s largely drawn upon West European proposals.
After Helsinki, the EC member states made détente and cooperation with the East a permanent task of the European Political Cooperation. Notwithstanding the return of the superpowers to a confrontational relation, the increasing dialogue between the halves of Europe did not experience a crises. On the contrary, it grew more intense and diversified as a result of the achievements of the CSCE.
At the first CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in Belgrade, the West European delegations criticised Moscow’s unwillingness to implement the Final Act provisions on human contacts and its repressive policy towards dissidents, but did not associate to the American delegation’s vigorous campaign that hampered any possibility of dialogue. On the contrary, they associated to the neutral and socialist countries in blaming the American attitude. It was evident that two years after Helsinki, where they had been the most active and intransigent negotiators on human contacts issues, Western European governments considered more convenient not to create tensions with the Communist bloc that could prevent the cooperation from going further.
Which benefits did the Nine want to preserve? Had relevant economic relations been established between the two halves of Europe? Were public opinions pressing for preserving or even enhancing détente? Had the Nine any political design and/or strategic goal on the future of the continent (e.g.: democratisation)?
It is the scope of this paper to answer these questions, as a result of a wide research through just released archival sources from the European Union Historical Archives, EU Council archives and some national archives (United Kingdom, France, United States).